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Comparative Fault as a Defense to Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform
Commercial Code
In practice it may be quite difficult, given a set of facts, to distinguish
liability for breach of warranty from the various tort theories of prod-
ucts liability. A plaintiff can often bring an action for injuries caused
by a defective product based on theories of negligence, strict products
liability, and breach of warranty.I The reasoning behind each cause of
action is that the seller should be responsible for the damages caused
by his product,2 but each theory sets forth a somewhat different stan-
dard for liability.
Originally, warranty developed under the common law as a tort
cause of action.3 Gradually, buyers began to bring warranty actions
based on contract, and courts began to recognize warranty as a term to
a sales contract.' Thus, when states enacted the Uniform Commercial
Code (hereinafter U.C.C.) to reform commercial law, the statute in-
cluded warranty provisions.' The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act6 further increased consumer pro-
tection in warranty law.
The U.C.C. provisions for warranty are included in § 2-313, dealing
with express warranties, and §§ 2-314 and 2-315, dealing with implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. For
a plaintiff to bring a successful action for breach of warranty, he must
first prove that the defendant made a warranty under § 2-313, § 2-314,
or § 2-315. He must then prove that the goods were defective at the
time of sale in that they did not conform to the warranty. Next, he
must show that the defect in the product was the proximate cause of his
injury. Finally, he must prove his damages.7
1. See I L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (1978); 1 R. HURSH & H.
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1:2, 1:3 (2d ed. 1974); W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 96-98 (4th ed. 1971).
2. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 96.
3. Id §97.
4. See Rasmus v. A.O. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70, 78-81 (D. Iowa 1958); W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 95.
5. For a history of the U.C.C., see Malcom, The Uniform Commercial Code in the United
States, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 226 (1963).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1979). The Act is limited to consumer buyers and consumer
products. It sets forth minimum disclosure requirements for written warranties and provides cer-
tain remedies to consumers for nondisclosure or nonconformity. The Act does not affect the pro-
visions of the U.C.C. discussed in this note except to limit the kinds of disclaimers that one may
use with respect to implied warranties.
7. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 13 (1978). See infra note 19.
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The plaintiff proceeding on a negligence theory must meet several of
the same requirements as required for breach of warranty. In both
warranty and negligence, for example, the plaintiff must prove cause in
fact' and proximate causation9 on the part of the defendant. In a negli-
gence suit, however, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was
negligent by failing to exercise due, ordinary, or reasonable care in the
manufacture or sale of the product. The U.C.C. is not the basis for
negligence liability.
The concept of strict tort liability is also distinct from warranty lia-
bility arising under the U.C.C. The Second Restatement of the Law of
Torts, § 402A l° indicates that strict tort liability applies without regard
to whether there was a warranty, express or implied, or whether privity,
notice, or disclaimer limited the warranty. The plaintiff must show that
the product that the defendant manufactured or sold was in a defective
condition, that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property, and that the product, in a defective condition, caused
harm to the consumer or user or to his property. Additionally, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in the business of sell-
ing the product and that the product reached the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it left the seller."
Once the plaintiff has established a case in strict tort liability, negli-
gence or breach of warranty, he could encounter a variety of defenses.
Among these are defenses based upon the plaintiff's own improper be-
havior, such as contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or mis-
use. In actions based upon breach of warranty, however, courts widely
disagree over the availability of defenses based upon the actions of the
8. Cause in fact is the particular cause that produces an event and without which the event
would not have occurred. Thus, in a products liability suit the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defective product brought about the resultant injury.
9. Proximate cause is the dominant, moving or producing cause. The proximate cause of an
injury is the primary cause which produces the injury without which the injury could not happen.
A defective product was the proximate cause of the injury if it played a substantial part in bring-
ing about or causing the injury and the injury resulted from the defective product.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
11. For sources on strict products liability, see generally L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 1; R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 1.
629
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injured party.'2 The problem of classifying warranty as either a con-
tract or tort cause of action leads to a question of whether contributory
negligence is a proper defense.' 3 Additionally, principles of contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of the risk, misuse, proximate cause, duty
to mitigate damages, duty of a buyer to inspect goods, and failure of a
buyer to rely on a warranty often overlap and courts use these defenses
interchangeably. The rules are quite unsettled concerning proper de-
fenses to warranty actions. The resulting uncertain state of the law
presents problems for the defendant seeking to base his defense on the
plaintiff's actions. 4
Much of this confusion no longer exists with regard to defenses to
negligence or strict products liability actions. Several jurisdictions have
adopted comparative negligence in negligence actions' 5 and compara-
tive responsibility in strict products liability actions' 6 to replace the
traditional defenses based upon a plaintiffs contributory behavior.
Under comparative principles, courts decide the relative amounts that
the plaintiffs actions and the defendant's defective product contributed
to the injury and apportion the damages accordingly.
In addition to eliminating the confusion over various defenses, appli-
cation of comparative principles often produces a more equitable result
than the use of traditional defenses. The policy behind defenses such
as contributory negligence is that if a court is to hold one person liable
for his fault then the court should also consider the fault of the person
seeking to enforce that liability. 7 Yet, while this reasoning is based on
fairness, the problem has been that courts apply the defenses as harsh
all-or-nothing rules.' 8 Jurisdictions adopt comparative fault to produce
a more equitable result by apportioning the fault between the responsi-
ble parties, rather than having the claimant's contributory fault totally
bar recovery.
In breach of warranty actions, however, only a few jurisdictions ap-
ply comparative fault. Thus, warranty trails behind the increasing
trend of courts to use comparative principles in products liability ac-
tions. This note discusses the current problems with the use of tradi-
tional defenses based upon a plaintiffs contributory behavior in
warranty actions under the U.C.C. and examines the various methods
of comparative fault which might solve these problems. Finally, this
12. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01[3] (1978); 1 R. HURSH
& H. BAILEY, supra note 1, § 3:81; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-8 (2d ed. 1980); Annot. 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
14. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 64.
16. See infra note 65.
17. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.3, at 1207 (1956).
18. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
3
Gettel: Comparative Fault as a Defense to Breach of Warranty under the Un
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
COMPA R.AT I VE FA UL T
note urges adoption of the new Uniform Comparative Fault Act as the
best scheme of comparative fault for breach of warranty actions under
the U.C.C.
I. DEFENSES To A BREACH OF WARRANTY
ACTION UNDER THE U.C.C.
The warranty provisions of the U.C.C. do not explicitly provide for
defenses to warranty actions based upon a plaintiff's contributory be-
havior. But demonstration by a seller that the loss the plaintiff seeks to
recover resulted from some event following delivery can work as a de-
fense.' 9 The U.C.C., in comment 5 to § 2-715, gives only two examples
of defenses based upon a plaintiff's contributory behavior: unreasona-
ble failure to inspect goods and discovery of a defect in the goods prior
to use. These actions by the plaintiff demonstrate that the injury did
not proximately result from the breach.2°
Other U.C.C. provisions also speak in terms of proximate cause and
suggest that a plaintiff may not be able to recover for damages that he
caused. Section 2-714(2) provides recovery to the plaintiff for the loss
of value in a good because of breach of warranty "unless special cir-
cumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.' Section
2-715(2)(b) grants consequential damages for injury to person or prop-
erty proximately resulting from the breach of warranty. 22
According to comment 13 to § 2-314, the plaintiff-buyer must
demonstrate that the breach of warranty is the proximate cause of the
19. Comment 13 to U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) states:
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to show not only the
existence of the warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and that the breach of the
warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. In such an action an affirmative
showing by the seller that the loss resulted from some action or event following his own
delivery of the goods can operate as a defense. Equally, evidence indicating that the seller
exercised care in the manufacture, processing or selection of the goods is relevant to the issue
of whether the warranty was in fact broken. Action by the buyer following an examination of
the goods which ought to have indicated the defect complained of can be shown as matter
bearing on whether the breach itself was the cause of the injury.
20. Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978) states:
Subsection (2)(b) states the usual rule as to breach of warranty, allowing recovery for inju-
ries "proximately" resulting from the breach. Where the injury involved follows the use of
goods without discovery of the defect causing the damage, the question of "proximate" cause
turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such inspection as
would have revealed the defects. If it was not reasonable for him to do so, or if he did in fact
discover the defect prior to his use, the injury would not proximately result from the breach
of warranty.
21. U.C.C. § 2-714(2)(1978) states: "The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show
proximate damages of a different amount."
22. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b)(1978) states: "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include ... injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty."
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injury. If the buyer's actions alone cause the injury, the breach of war-
ranty is not the proximate cause of the injury and the buyer cannot
recover. However, the U.C.C. does not explicitly prevent the buyer
from recovering damages when he is only partially at fault. Thus, the
U.C.C. leaves a great deal of uncertainty concerning the proper de-
fenses to breach of warranty actions. Therefore, courts apply a wide
variety of traditional defenses based upon a plaintiffs contributory be-
havior to warranty actions.23
II. TRADITIONAL DEFENSES TO AN ACTION
FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
Among the defenses applied to breach of warranty actions are con-
tributory negligence, assumption of the risk, misuse, proximate cause,
duty to mitigate damages, duty of a buyer to inspect goods, and failure
of a buyer to rely on a warranty. These defenses, based on the im-
proper behavior of the plaintiff, are not mutually exclusive, and a court
can combine them.24
A. Contributory Negligence
A number of states25 permit contributory negligence as a defense to
warranty actions. 26 In these jurisdictions, if the plaintiff does not exer-
cise due, ordinary, or reasonable care in his use of the product, he may
not recover damages for breach of warranty. The plaintiff's failure to
discover the dangerous product and to guard against it is no defense;
there must be some fault on the plaintiff's part in his use of the prod-
23. These problems exist in warranty law whether or not governed by the U.C.C. Because
the U.C.C. does not make specific provisions for defenses to warranty actions, courts will also
follow pre-Code law. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). Accordingly, this note presents cases not gov-
erned by the U.C.C., as well as those where the U.C.C. was applied.
24. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
25. The exact number of states permitting any one of the defenses discussed infra can only be
guessed. This is partly because of the conflicting case law within single jurisdictions. See infra
note 35. Additionally, several jurisdictions have recently enacted comparative fault statutes that
may be applied instead of existing case law. See infra notes 96-106.
26. See, e.g., Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 836 (Alaska
1967); Coleman v. American Universal, 264 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Gardner v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 511, 127 N.W.2d 557, 562 (1964); Stephan v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv.,
45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, 100 N.J. Super. 515, 522, 242 A.2d
663, 666-67 (1968); Uribe v. Armstrong Rubber & Tire Co., 55 A.D.2d 869, 390 N.Y.S.2d 419
(1977); Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971). Note that each of the above
cases is from a jurisdiction that has instituted comparative fault in strict products liability cases.
See infra note 65. Several jurisdictions have comparative fault statutes that purport to be applica-
ble to warranty actions but have not yet been applied. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying
text. See also Reed v. AMF Western Tool, Inc., 431 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1970); Dallison v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962); Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co.,
260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970); Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468 P.2d 969 (Wyo.
1970).
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uct.27 Likewise, contributory negligence does not bar a plaintiff's re-
covery when his negligence was foreseeable and he was merely testing
the warranty.28 The plaintiff is not contributorily negligent if his ac-
tions are simply in reliance on the warranty.
Hansen v. Firestone Rubber Co. 29 is an example of this limitation in
the application of contributory negligence to warranty actions. In Han-
sen, the plaintiff-buyer sued the defendant-manufacturer for personal
injuries caused when his new tires failed to perform as expressly war-
ranted. The manufacturer sought to demonstrate that the buyer was
negligent in using the tires within the warranted limits because the
buyer was driving through a dangerous curve when the tires failed.
However, the court refused to consider actions of the buyer that merely
brought about circumstances in which he tested the warranty. The
court disallowed the use of contributory negligence because the defend-
ant failed to prove that the plaintiff was unjustified in his reliance on
the warranty. 0
Some courts allow the defense of contributory negligence when the
facts can support either negligence or breach of warranty theories be-
cause the label should not make a difference. 3' Other courts emphasize
that breach of warranty historically sounded in tort 32 and, therefore,
contributory negligence is a proper defense. Conversely, several juris-
dictions do not allow contributory negligence as a defense in an action
for breach of warranty,33 sometimes holding that contributory negli-
gence is a proper defense only to negligence actions.34  These courts
reason that breach of warranty is a contract, rather than tort, cause of
action and refuse to apply the tort concept of contributory negligence.
The rules of whether to apply contributory negligence to breach of
27. McCabe v. L.K. Liggett Drug Co., 330 Mass. 177, 112 N.E.2d 254 (1953); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ 102.
28. Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co.,
290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Covil Insulation Co., 264 S.C.
604, 216 S.E.2d 532 (1975).
29. 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
30. Id at 259.
31. Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc. v. Cotter, 212 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
915 (1955).
32. See Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964); Nelson
v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 614-15 (1958).
33. See, e.g., Mathews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Chapman,
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Holt v. Stihl, 449 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Rasmus v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Preston v. Upright, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52
Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Jarnot v.
Ford Motor Co., 198 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
34. See, e.g., Rasmus v. A.O. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70,78 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Kassouf v.
Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (1962); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95
Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857, 859 (1974).
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warranty actions are unsettled even within single jurisdictions. 35 More-
over, courts compound the problems of delineating defenses by using
other defenses similar to contributory negligence under different labels.
For example, in some jurisdictions where contributory negligence is not
a defense to liability, courts may consider a plaintiffs negligence in the
mitigation of damages.36 Taking a different approach, at least one
court has set forth the Restatement of Contracts § 336 3 ' as the better
alternative to applying contributory negligence, finding that a plaintiff
who should have foreseen or could have reasonably avoided harm can-
not recover damages.38
B. Assumption of the Risk
Another defense used in place of, and often confused with, contribu-
tory negligence is assumption of the risk. While the defenses of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of the risk often overlap, they are
separate defenses applicable in different situations. Contributory negli-
gence refers to a plaintiff's conduct that is below the standard required
to protect himself, whereas assumption of the risk refers to a plaintiff's
voluntary action in the face of a known risk.39 Assumption of the risk
can include situations where a party is unreasonable in voluntarily pro-
ceeding in the face of known danger' or where a buyer continues to
35. See, e.g., Colorado: Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343, 345-47 (10th Cir.
1962) (allowing contributory negligence); Hensley v. Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co., 33 Colo.
App. 279, 520 P.2d 146, 148 (1974) (disallowing contributory negligence). Idaho: Reed v. AMF
Western Tool, Inc., 431 F.2d 345, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1970) (defense); Henderson v. Comico Am. Inc.,
95 Idaho 690, 518 P.2d 873, 877-78 (1974) (no defense). Indiana: Scotco, Inc. v. Dormeyer Indus.
402 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1968) (allowing); Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245, 250
(7th Cir. 1965) (dictum stating that contributory negligence is no defense); Gregory v. White
Truck & Equip. Co., 163 Ind. App. 240, 323 N.E.2d 280, 285 (1975) (no defense). Kansas: Frier v.
Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 173 Kan. 733, 252 P.2d 850, 852 (1953), as explained in Graham v.
Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413, 418 (1954) (defense); Bereman v. Burdolski, 204
Kan. 162, 460 P.2d 567, 573 (1969) (defense); Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199, 203
(1933) (no defense); Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633, 635
(1957) (no defense). Missouri: Bullock v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 392 S.W.2d 10, 13-14 (Mo.
App. 1965) (defense); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 454 S.W.2d 611, 617-18 (Mo. App. 1970) (no
defense). Ohio: Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289, 292-93 (1951)
(defense); Wood v. Gen. Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8, 11 (1953) (no defense). Wash-
ington: Matthias v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 541, 424 P.2d 284, 289-90 (1967)
(defense); Stark v. Allis Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 399, 467 P.2d 854, 858
(1970) (no defense).
36. Hinderer v. Ryan, 7 Wash. App. 434, 499 P.2d 252 (1972). See also Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d
511 (1954).
37. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1962) states: "(1) Damages are not recoverable for
harm that the plaintiff should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort without
undue risk, expense, or humiliation."
38. Jarot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
39. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, §§ 65, 68; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 11-8.
40. See, e.g., Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1971); Reed v.
AMF Western Tool, Inc., 431 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
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use a product knowing that the seller has breached a warranty.4'
The facts of Erdman P. Johnson Brothers Radio & Television Co.42
illustrate assumption of the risk. Erdman purchased a television from
Johnson Brothers Radio & Television Company. A few months later
he noticed smoke and sparks emanating from the back of the set and
called Johnson Brothers to complain. Johnson Brothers was to send
out a serviceman within three days to repair the set. Meanwhile,
Erdman continued to use the television despite the smoke and sparks.
The television set started a fire that completely destroyed Erdman's
house, and Erdman filed suit against Johnson Brothers for breach of
implied warranty. The trial court found that Erdman was contribu-
torily negligent and rendered judgment for Johnson Brothers. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that although the seller
breached the warranty, the breach was not the proximate cause of the
fire that destroyed Erdman's home. Erdman's continued use of the tel-
evision in spite of the emission of sparks and smoke amounted either to
an abandonment of his reliance on the seller's implied warranty or con-
tributory negligence.43 Erdman assumed the risk because he was aware
of the danger and continued to use the television set. The court held
that a buyer cannot rely on a warranty when he is aware of the danger
involved or when the danger is obvious enough that an ordinarily pru-
dent person would not rely on the warranty."
C. Proximate Cause, Misuse and Lack of Reliance on a Warranty
In Erdman, the court recognized that any attempt to label the de-
fenses available for breach of warranty actions based upon a plaintifis
contributory behavior is merely "an exercise in semantics."45 The
court spoke in terms of contributory negligence and lack of reliance on
the warranty but emphasized that whatever label a court uses, "the im-
1962); Phillips v. Allen, 427 F. Supp. 876, 879-80 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Bronson v. Club Comanche,
Inc., 286 F. Supp. 21 (D.V.I. 1968); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind.
1965); Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Gipson, 116 Ga. App. 760, 159 S.E.2d 171 (1967); Williams v.
Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Gregory v. White Truck & Equip. Co., 163
Ind. App. 240, 323 N.E.2d 280, 286-88 (1975); Bereman v. Burdolski, 204 Kan. 162, 460 P.2d 567
(1969); Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963); Gob-
lirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 246 N.W.2d 687, 691 (1976); Bullock v. Benja-
min Moore & Co., 392 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1965); Walk v. J.I. Case Co., 36 A.D.2d 60, 318
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1971); Stark v. Allis Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 399, 467
P.2d 854 (1970); Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1970).
41. Cedar Rapids & I.C.R. & L. Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 280 Ill. 386, 117 N.E. 461 (1917);
Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950). See U.C.C. § 2-
607(3)(a)(1978), which requires a buyer to notify a seller of breach of warranty. See also infra
note 51.
42. 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
43. 1d. at 747.
44. Id. at 751.
45. Id. at 749.
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portant factor" is that the breach of warranty is not the proximate
cause of the loss. The Erdman court recognized that the U.C.C. speaks
in terms of causation and that actions by the plaintiff may break the
causal chain between breach of warranty and injury, thus barring the
plaintiff's recovery."
Other courts have also decided warranty cases involving defenses
based upon a plaintiffs contributory behavior using a proximate cause
analysis.47 Caldwell v. Lord & Taylor48 illustrates the use of proximate
cause. Caldwell purchased false eyelashes in a Lord & Taylor store. A
manufacturer's representative who applied the eyelashes warned Cald-
well of possible irritation if the eyelash adhesive came in contact with
the plaintiffs skin or eyes. In the process of application the representa-
tive introduced some of the adhesive into Caldwell's eye, causing in-
jury, and Caldwell sued Lord & Taylor for breach of warranty. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the appel-
late court affirmed, holding that the injury was caused by misuse of the
product rather than by breach of warranty. When properly applied,
the eyelashes did function for the ordinary purpose for which they were
intended, and misapplication, rather than a defect in the product itself,
caused the injury.
While the Caldwell court dealt with misuse of the product by the
plaintiff as showing a lack of proximate cause, other courts recognize
misuse alone as a defense to liability.49 Thus, where pork eaten raw
caused the plaintiffs injury, courts have not held the meat packer liable
because the warranty would only apply to food prepared in the usual
and proper manner.5" Similarly, some decisions hold that a buyer's
46. Id
47. See, e.g., Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Meyers & Assoc., 517 F.2d 188, 191-92 (5th Cir.
1975); Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962); General Instrument Corp.
v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 139, 150 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Rasmus v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 224
S.E.2d 168, 170 (1976); McCleskey v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 127 Ga. App. 178, 193 S.E.2d
16 (1972); Jacobs Pharmacy Co., v. Gipson, 116 Ga. App. 760, 159 S.E.2d 171 (1967); Chisolm v.
J.R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 628, 495 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1972); Haralampopoulos v. Capital News
Agency, Inc., 70 111. App. 2d 17, 217 N.E.2d 366 (1966); Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebavy Sorenson
Orchard Co., 66 Mich. App. 642, 239 N.W.2d 693, 695 (1976); Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical
Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952); Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214
A.2d 18 (1965).
48. 142 Ga. App. 137, 235 S.E.2d 546 (1977).
49. See Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 815 (4th Cir. 1966) (applying Ohio law);
Goodman v. Stalfort, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 889 (D.N.J. 1976); Rasmus v. A.O. Smith Corp., 158 F.
Supp. 70 (D. Iowa 1958); Preston v. Upright, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966);
Avoyelles Country Club, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 338 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1976); Crews v.
General Motors Corp., 400 Mich. 208, 253 N.W.2d 617 (1977); Speyer, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 222 Pa. Super. 261, 295 A.2d 143 (1972).
50. Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 A.2d 277, 280 (1954); Cheli v. Cudahy
Bros. 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414, 416 (1934).
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conduct demonstrates that he did not rely on the warranty. 5' There-
fore, if the unsafe condition of the product is visible or obvious to the
plaintiff the defendant is not liable for an implied warranty because the
plaintiff contracted to buy the product in its known or obvious
condition.52
III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DEFENSES AVAILABLE
FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
Generally, every jurisdiction recognizes some defense based upon
the contributory fault of the plaintiff. As recognized in Erdman v. John-
son Brothers Radio & Television Co. ,5 the inconsistency between juris-
dictions in the law of warranty is the fault of the language. Because
conflicting labels identify the plaintiff's contributory behavior, the true
amount of agreement among different jurisdictions is difficult to deter-
mine. The attorney for the defendant must carefully study the rules of
his jurisdiction concerning proper defenses to U.C.C. warranty actions,
and even then he may find the law unsettled.
A problem exists because parties cannot be sure which traditional
defense based upon the behavior of an injured party will apply to a
warranty action. It makes little sense that courts will allow the intro-
duction of evidence of a plaintiff's contributory fault only so long as the
defendant properly labels the behavior. The result of a trial may then
hinge on a semantic disagreement over defenses that a court will allow.
Some courts have circumvented the semantic problem by allowing a
defendant to introduce any evidence demonstrating that a lack of prox-
imate cause, rather than the breach of warranty, actually caused the
injury.54 The traditional defenses, however, present other problems as
well. Demonstration of contributory negligence, assumption of the
risk, misuse, and lack of proximate cause acts as a complete bar to a
plaintiff's recovery. Application of these traditional all-or-nothing de-
fenses can often produce inequitable results because they put the bur-
den of loss entirely on one party and do not distribute responsibility in
proportion to each party's fault.55 Courts applying traditional defenses
give no reason why the manufacturer should bear the loss attributable
to the plaintiff's actions or why the plaintiff should bear the burden of
injuries caused by a manufacturer's product.
51. See Driver v. Snow, 245 N.C. 223, 95 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1956); Marko v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 24 N.J. Super. 295, 94 A.2d 348, 350 (1953); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1,
§ 19.0113]; 77 C.J.S. Sales § 315 (1981).
52. Brockett v. Harrel Bros., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965).
53. 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744, 751 (1970).
54. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
55. See Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Maine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139-40
(9th Cir. 1977); Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 754 (D. Kan. 1978).
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Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 56 illustrates the inequita-
ble result brought about by application of such all-or-nothing defenses.
In Barefield, the plaintiff had consumed about half a bottle of Coca-
Cola when she gagged on something. Thinking it was either a small
piece of ice or loose tobacco from her cigarette, she took another swal-
low. She again gagged and this time discovered a piece of glass from
the bottle. Although she suffered a cut in her throat, when she sued
Coca-Cola for breach of implied warranty, the court denied her recov-
ery on the ground that she had assumed the risk. The plaintiffs fault in
continuing to drink the product after she discovered or should have
discovered that it contained particles of glass completely barred her re-
covery.57 Thus, when a court applies one of the traditional defenses a
plaintiff who is only marginally responsible for the injury is not able to
recover at all.
The harsh application of the traditional all-or-nothing defenses has
led to the application of comparative principles in strict products liabil-
ity and negligence actions to apportion damages between the buyer and
manufacturer according to their respective responsibilities for the in-
jury." This use of comparative principles in negligence and strict tort
products liability actions further complicates the application of tradi-
tional defenses in breach of warranty actions. Courts may have proce-
dural problems in applying one rule of recovery for actions brought in
negligence or strict liability and another rule for breach of warranty.
The three theories of recovery overlap, and particularly under fact
pleading59 plaintiffs frequently plead all three products liability theo-
ries in the alternative. It would be incongruous in a products liability
case to have damages mitigated if the plaintiff sues in negligence or
strict tort but allow him full damages if he sues in warranty, 60 particu-
larly where the complaint contains alternative counts of recovery in
negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty.61 In a ju-
risdiction that has comparative negligence for negligence actions but
not comparative fault for breach of warranty actions, a bizarre result
56. 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786, 788 (1963).
57. Id at 788-89.
58. See Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in War-
ranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968).
59. Under fact pleading, a complaint must contain a plain and concise statement of the facts
constituting a cause of action. The cause of action consists of the facts alleged rather than the
conclusions of the pleader. When the complaint merely alleges theories or conclusions and not
facts, it fails to state a cause of action and is demurrable. However, if it presents any facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action, the pleading will stand. See Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv.
Stores, 258 N.C. 487, 128 S.E.2d 762 (1963). Therefore, a complaint may contain facts sufficient to
constitute causes of action in negligence, strict products liability and breach of warranty.
60. Note that the opposite result may occur if a court applies one of the traditional defenses.
Plaintiff's recovery will be totally barred rather than partly reduced.
61. Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42. 46 (Alaska 1976).
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may occur. Proceeding on a warranty theory developed to protect the
consumer and to make a seller more responsible for his product may
result in a court completely barring a plaintiff from recovery, whereas
the same court would only diminish the recovery of a plaintiff who
proceeded on a negligence theory.62
Currently, the law concerning defenses to breach of warranty actions
based upon the contributory behavior of the injured party is compli-
cated and non-uniform. There is a large gap in the provisions of the
U.C.C. enacted by jurisdictions to simplify, clarify, modernize and
make uniform commercial law, including warranty. 63 The use of com-
parative principles integrated within the U.C.C. warranty provisions is
necessary to make products liability law uniform and more equitable.
IV. THE USE OF COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES
In negligence actions, nearly three-quarters of the states have re-
placed the doctrine of contributory negligence with comparative negli-
gence.' The trend toward the use of comparative principles has
continued into strict products liability cases where courts have replaced
traditional defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk with comparative responsibility. 65  In eight states a move to
62. Daley v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
63. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1978).
64. At least 33 states and Puerto Rico have comparative negligence. Only eight of these
jurisdictions (Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Puerto Rico, South Dakota and
Wisconsin) adopted comparative negligence prior to 1965. See Alaska: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d
1037 (Alaska 1975);Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); California: Nga Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Colorado: COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 (1963); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West Supp. 1984).
Florida: Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603
(1968); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1968); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN., §§ 6-801, 802
(1971): Illinois: Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Il. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886, (1981); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-258a (1963);Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964). Massachusetts: MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1969); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604 (West 1969); Missis-
sippi: Miss. CODE § 11-7-15 (1972); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 58-607.1 (1975); Nebraska:
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (Supp. 1982); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979); New Hamp-
shire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-2 (Supp. 1981); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN., §§ 2A:15-5.1
to .3 (West Supp. 1983); New York: N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); North Da-
kota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp.
1982); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1981); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101,
repealed by 1978 Pa. Laws 202;Puerto Rico: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1982); South Dakota: S.D. COMp. LAWS § 20-9-2 (1979);
Texas: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1982); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-27-37 to -43 (1973); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1983); Washington:
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1983); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West
1983); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-109 (1977).
65. Jurisdictions applying comparative principles in strict products liability actions are
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin.
See Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Maine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977);
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comparative responsibility in strict products liability has meant a move
in the same direction to comparative fault66 for breach of warranty ac-
tions.67 While there seems to be a trend toward the use of comparative
principles in products liability cases, the issue of whether courts should
apply comparative principles to warranty actions is still unsettled. Op-
ponents have advanced several arguments against instituting compara-
tive fault, but courts have rejected most of these in cases involving strict
products liability.68
The primary argument against application of comparative fault is
that the nature of the liability of the parties is different and therefore
incomparable. Because the primary focus in products liability cases is
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Murray v. Beloit Power Sys., Inc.,
450 F. Supp. 1145 (D.V.I. 1978); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp.
598 (D. Idaho 1976); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972);
Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daley v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Safeway Stores Inc. v.
Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d (Minn. 1977); Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J.,
81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 140, 402
A.2d 140 (1979); Baccalleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1978); Hamilton v. Motor
Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1978); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301
(Utah 1981); Berry v. Coleman Sys. Co., 23 Wash. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365 (1979); Austin v. Ford
Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979); Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55 (1967).
66. The terms comparative fault and comparative responsibility are used interchangeably. In
both cases, courts compare the respective behavior of the parties.
67. The states applying comparative fault to warranty actions are Arkansas, Connecticut,
Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Texas and Washington. See infra notes 82-106.
68. For commentary, see Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR
L. 107, 117-18 (1976); Buchanan, Products Liability Defenses Under the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act and State Legislation, 15 FORUM 813 (1980); Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative
Negligence and Strict Liability-Where Are We?, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 53 (1980); Dworkin, Product
Liability Reform and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 60 NEB. L. REV. 50 (1980); Epstein,
Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 68 UTAH L. REV. 267, 284 (1968); Fein-
berg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict Liability Suit Based on
Section 402,4 ofthe Restatement of Torts, 2d, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39, 52 (1975); Fischer, Products
Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV. 431, 433 (1978); Fisher, Nu-
gent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 674
(1974); Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-1975-Forward" Comparative Negligence
at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 268-71 (1976); Freedman, The Comparative
Negligence Doctrine Under Strict Liability. Defendant's Conduct Becomes Another "Proximate
Cause" ofIniury, Damage or Loss, 975 INS. L. REV. 468, 479; Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting
the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 656-63 (1968); Noel,
Defective Products. Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 93, 115-19 (1972); Pinto, Comparative Responsibility-An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 45
INS. COUNSEL J. 115, 127 (1978); Robinson, Square Pegs (Products Liability) in Round Holes (Com-
parative Negligence), 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 16 (1977); Schwartz, Pure Comparative Negligence in Action,
34 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 117, 128-31 (1972); Twerski, The Many Faces ofMisuse: An Inquiry into the
Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 436 (1978); Wade, Prod-
ucts Liability and Plainti'/7s Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373,
391 (1978); Note, Sales Assumption ofthe Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-Prelude to Com-
parative Fault, II TEX. TECH. L. REV. 729 (1980).
13
Gettel: Comparative Fault as a Defense to Breach of Warranty under the Un
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
COMPARATIVE FA UL T
on whether a defective product caused the injury rather than on the
defendant's conduct, some courts have found comparison of the plain-
tiff's conduct inappropriate.69 Yet, courts already apply comparative
principles in some sense. 70 Courts have been unwilling to make a man-
ufacturer's liability for damages absolute and convert him into an in-
surer of his product with respect to any harm generated by use of the
product. As a result, courts apply various defenses based upon the con-
tributory conduct of the plaintiff.7' This result may be caused by a
recognition that strict liability, including breach of warranty, is not re-
ally liability without fault.72 Products liability actions developed so
that the seller would bear the responsibility for injuries or damages
caused by his product.73 The seller is at fault because his product is
bad since it causes injury. The fault is in the unreasonably dangerous
or, in the case of warranty, unmerchantable condition of the product.
Thus, courts can at least compare the seller's fault with the buyer's fault
in terms of causation by deciding the relative amounts that the plain-
tiffs actions and the defendant's defective product contributed to the
injury.
74
Opponents of comparative fault argue, moreover, that courts that ap-
ply the doctrine will have a great deal of difficulty in apportioning
damages because of the inexactitude in measuring fault.7 5 In practice,
however, there should be no more difficulty in comparing fault in a
breach of warranty suit than in a negligence suit.76 Even difficulty in
69. See, e.g., Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976).
70. Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
71. Id at 45.
72. Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29
MERCER L. REV. 373, 377 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 224 F.2d 293, 295 (3d Cir.
1955); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1052 (1916).
74. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho
1976); Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976); Daley
v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-68, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v.
Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
Under comparative principles in strict products liability actions courts decide the relative
amounts that the plaintiffs actions and the defendant's defective product contributed to the injury.
This is not a comparison of apples and oranges. The defendant is still strictly liable for his prod-
uct without regard to whether he was negligent or not. He is only liable, however, to the extent the
product caused the injury. The plaintiff is liable for his own misuse of the product. This produces
a more equitable result because strict liability is not absolute liability for the product however it is
used. The comparison is not between the defendant's fault and the plaintiffs fault but between
the inherent danger in the product and the plaintiffs misuse of it. There is no reason why the
manufacturer should bear the loss attributable to the plaintiffs actions or the plaintiff should bear
the burden of injuries caused by a manufacturer's product.
75. See Daley v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1177, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978) (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
76. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 208 (1974); Butuad v. Suburban Marine &
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properly awarding damages is not sufficient justification for the all-or-
nothing liability that results from the use of traditional defenses. A
slightly inexact apportionment is certainly better than allowing the to-
tal barring effect of contributory negligence or completely refusing to
consider a plaintiffs fault.
Finally, opponents of comparative fault argue that application of the
doctrine will frustrate the purposes of warranty: to place the responsi-
bility on the manufacturer, who can best bear the loss and pass it on to
society, rather than on injured consumers, and to give manufacturers
an incentive to make products safe. This is not so. While comparative
fault reduces a seller's exposure to liability to the extent that the plain-
tiff's actions contributed to the injury, the same principles may increase
a seller's exposure by allowing a normally barred plaintiff some recov-
ery as a consequence of the defendant's sale of an unmerchantable
product.7 The seller would still be liable for all of the damages caused
by his product. Thus, the motivation to make a safe product will not
disappear.
Opponents of comparative fault give no compelling social or practi-
cal reason why a party should bear more than its fair share of the loss
in a warranty action. The arguments against comparative fault cannot
outweigh the advantages because comparative principles are preferable
to the inequitable and confusing traditional defenses. Various methods
of adopting comparative fault are available, however, and the key to
making the doctrine work effectively is in choosing the best alternative
method.
Jurisdictions can enact comparative fault in breach of warranty cases
by adoption of the judicial doctrine of comparative causation78 or by
adoption of the judicial doctrine of comparative fault,79 by application
of the state's comparative negligence statute,80 or by legislative adop-
tion of a comparative fault statute such as the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act.8 ' Under each method, the plaintiff will not recover damages
to the extent he is at fault. The seller will only be liable for damages
caused by the defective product. When the buyer's actions contribute
to the injury, a court will apportion the damages according to each
party's respective fault.
Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976); Daley v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring).
77. Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 754 (D. Kan. 1978); Daley v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
78. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
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A. Judicial Doctrine of Comparative Causation
Courts have not yet applied most methods of comparative fault to
breach of warranty cases, although they have used each method in
strict products liability cases. One jurisdiction, Texas, applies compar-
ative causation to warranty cases. Under comparative causation a
court divides the loss according to the relative degrees the plaintiff's
fault and the defendant's defective product proximately caused the in-
jury. Thus, in a breach of warranty action the buyer cannot recover
damages to the extent that his fault was a concurring proximate cause
of the injury.
The leading case in the area of comparative causation is Signal Oil &
Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products .82 In this case, Signal Oil and Gas
Company (Signal) contracted with Universal Oil Products for the li-
censing of an isomax processing unit and with Procon, Inc., a subsidi-
ary of Universal Oil Products, for the construction of the unit and a
hydrogen plant at Signal's refinery. Procon purchased a reactor charge
heater for the isomax unit from Alcorn Combustion Company and
completed the construction. A month after operation of the hydrogen
plant began, Procon discovered a defect in the design of the reactor
charge heater and warned Signal of the hazard, but Signal disregarded
the warning. Two months later the isomax unit exploded, causing a
fire that damaged Signal's plant. Signal sued Universal Oil Products,
Procon, and Alcorn in negligence, strict liability and breach of implied
warranty.
The trial court denied Signal relief on each of the theories. The jury
found that Signal's actions in not shutting down the heater when
Procon discovered the defect constituted contributory negligence. The
court then held that this negligence barred recovery under negligence
and breach of warranty theories. Signal was denied recovery under
strict liability because the jury failed to find that the defective condition
constituted a producing cause of the explosion.
Signal appealed on the theory that contributory negligence is not a
defense to breach of implied warranty. Relying heavily on the lan-
guage in U.C.C. §§ 2-714(2), 2-715(2)(b) and comment 5 to § 2-71583 as
well as case law, 84 the court found that the U.C.C. indicates that the
buyer's negligence or fault is central to the issue of proximate causation
in awarding consequential damages.85 The court recognized breach of
82. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978); See Note, Product Liability-Implied Warranty-Recovery of
Consequential Damages in Breach of Implied Warranty Action Disallowed to Extent Buyer's Negli-
gence Was Concurring Proximate Cause, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 675 (1979).
83. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
84. See Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962); Rasmus v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958).
85. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Tex. 1978).
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warranty as a contract, rather than tort, cause of action and pointed out
that the U.C.C. does not state that a buyer's fault will completely bar
recovery. Thus, the court in Signal held that the buyer could recover
only those consequential damages proximately caused by the breach of
warranty, that the buyer could not recover damages proximately
caused by his own negligence or fault, and that the buyer's negligence
or fault, unless it was the sole cause of the damages, did not automati-
cally bar recovery but only diminished or mitigaged the damages that
the buyer could recover. Courts must institute comparative causation
by determining the relative percentage of the damages proximately
caused by the plaintiffs actions and by reducing his recovery to that
extent.
A number of states have comparative causation in actions based
upon strict products liability but have not extended the doctrine to
breach of warranty.86 Generally, courts have had no opportunity to
consider the issue. However, those states that eventually decide to ap-
ply comparative causation will discover problems with it. These
problems arise because causation alone is a difficult concept to apply.a7
Courts must consider the nature of the causes of injury in order to de-
termine fault. A court cannot simply identify the causal relation of the
actor's conduct to the injury. Many causes concur in producing a given
event, and without each one the event would not occur. This imprecise
combination makes it difficult to measure the contribution of a given
cause. In determining causation, a court must also consider the nature
of the actor's conduct, the personal culpability of the actor, as well as
physical causation. Comparative causation therefore requires consid-
eration of fault and is thus a less developed form of comparative fault
masked in the confusing terms of causation.8
B. Judicial Adoption of Comparative Fault
While there has been legislative adoption of comparative fault in
breach of warranty cases, no court has judicially adopted comparative
fault. Here warranty trails behind strict products liability, for under
the latter theory there are several decisions judicially adopting compar-
ative fault.89 These decisions demonstrate that it would be possible to
86. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
87. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 42; Carestia, supra note 68, at 64-68.
88. Fischer, supra note 68, at 445.
89. Courts may prefer to consider strict products liability cases rather than breach of war-
ranty cases. See Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680 (D.N.H. 1972).
"Strict liability in tort is a more appropriate remedy for the consumer who has received personal
injuries and . . . U.C.C. warranties are best suited to commercial settings." Nelson v. Volk-
swagen of America, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (D.N.H. 1970); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
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judicially adopt comparative fault in actions for breach of warranty.9 °
The problem is that judicial adoption of comparative fault does not
offer a complete and uniform system. Where there is no legislative
framework, the courts must define fault, determine apportionment of
damages, decide whether to adopt a pure or modified system of com-
parative fault, and analyze the effects of joint and several liability,
counterclaims and contribution. A judicially adopted system of com-
parative fault leaves courts to debate these issues as they arise. Mean-
while, the law remains in a state of flux.
C. Comparative Negligence
The drawbacks of judicially adopting comparative fault may cause
courts to apply the comparative negligence statutes of their jurisdic-
tions to breach of warranty actions rather than to adopt a new system
without legislative guidance.9' But application of a comparative negli-
gence statute to a breach of warranty action presents problems. In war-
ranty, the seller is strictly liable; he need not be negligent to be
responsible for defects in his product. Comparative negligence statutes
compare negligence. When the statutes deal only with negligence lia-
bility, they do not affect strict liability and courts cannot compare the
fault of the parties. In order to apply a comparative negligence statute
to a strict liability cause of action, a court must interpret the statute to
say something it does not and read it as a comparative fault statute. In
many cases, such liberal interpretation of a comparative fault statute
exceeds the intent of the legislature.
Some jurisdictions apply comparative negligence in all cases to
which contributory negligence was once applicable. Courts that in the
past have applied contributory negligence to breach of warranty ac-
tions might extend their reasoning92 and apply comparative negligence
statutes instead. Different jurisdictions would then disagree about the
proper application of a comparative negligence statute to breach of
warranty. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has already deter-
mined that the New Hampshire comparative negligence statute does
not apply to strict liability actions because the statute by its terms is
90. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Stueve v. American
Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976); Daley v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150
406 A.2d 140 (1979); Baccaleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979).
91. See, e.g., Stannard v. Harris, 135 Vt. 544, 380 A.2d 101 (1977) (impliedly applying com-
parative negligence statute to breach of warranty); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80
(Fla. 1976) (applying the state's comparative negligence statute to a strict products liability action).
92. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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limited to actions for negligence.
93
A specific problem exists in the application of modified comparative
negligence94 statutes to breach of warranty actions. Under modified
comparative negligence, the plaintiffs recovery is barred if he is found
to be more negligent than the defendant. In a breach of warranty case,
the defendant may not be negligent at all even though his product
caused the injury; warranty liability is strict liability, not negligence
liability. Therefore, even a plaintiff who is slightly negligent could be
more negligent than the defendant. Under modified comparative neg-
ligence, the plaintiffs recovery would be barred. Thus, application of
comparative negligence statutes does not present a satisfactory scheme
of comparative fault for warranty actions.
D. Comparative Fault Statutes: The Uniform Comparative Fault Act
The best alternative to applying comparative negligence statutes, ju-
dicially adopting comparative fault, or adopting comparative causation
is legislative adoption of comparative fault. A well constructed legisla-
tive system of comparative fault avoids the confusing terms of compar-
ative causation by comparing fault according to outlined standards
rather than measuring causes.95 Whereas judicial adoption of compar-
ative fault leaves the law in a state of flux because issues remain to be
decided, legislation can provide a complete and uniform system.
Moreover, courts need not improperly apply comparative negligence to
strictly liable parties when comparative fault is available. Legislation,
such as the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, offers all the advantages
of comparative fault without the disadvantages resulting from other
methods of adoption.
Seven states have enacted statutes that adopt comparative fault in
breach of warranty actions, although courts have not yet had an oppor-
tunity to apply the statutes in such cases.96 In Arkansas, the compara-
tive fault statute and the products liability act work together to provide
comparative fault in breach of warranty actions. Fault is defined as
93. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
94. Under pure comparative negligence the claimant receives judgment for his damages re-
duced by the percentage of his negligence, whether or not his negligence equals or exceeds that of
the defendant. Modified comparative negligence provides that a contributorily negligent plaintiff
can recover diminished damages only so long as his negligence does not exceed the negligence of
the defendant. Some modified comparative negligence jurisdictions also bar a plaintiffs recovery
if his negligence equals the defendant's negligence. A growing number of jurisdictions, including
the federal government, nine states and most common law jurisdictions outside of the United
States, use pure comparative principles.
95. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text and infra notes 109-111 and accompanying
text.
96. These states are Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, New York and
Washington.
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"any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty or
breach of any legal duty which is the proximate cause of any damages
sustained by any party."97 A defendant may demonstrate the plaintiffs
fault with evidence of use of the product beyond the anticipated life,98
subsequent unforeseeable alterations of the product, or improper main-
tenance or abnormal use of the product.99
Michigan has adopted a pure comparative negligence standard" in
actions for breach of warranty.' 0 ' Both New York and Washington
have adopted pure comparative fault, rather than comparative negli-
gence, statutes. 0 2 Idaho has instituted a pure comparative responsibil-
ity statute for products liability which identifies conduct by the plaintiff
that can affect comparative responsibility. Such conduct includes fail-
ure to discover a defective condition, failure to inspect, failure to ob-
serve an obvious defect, use of a product with a known defective
condition, or misuse, alteration or modification of a product. 0 3 In
Minnesota, a modified type of comparative fault permits recovery if the
plaintiffs fault is less than the defendant's fault."
No jurisdiction has yet enacted the new Uniform Comparative Fault
Act,'0 5 although Connecticut's comparative fault standard in products
liability actions incorporates a section of the Act.' 06 This lack of ac-
ceptance is surprising in view of the complete, uniform, and logical na-
ture of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The statute adopts fault
as the basis for apportioning responsibility in any action based on fault,
including negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty.
Thus, comparative negligence statutes need not be misapplied to non-
negligence actions. A plaintiffs fault includes all forms of fault charge-
able to him. Specifically included are negligence in any measure, reck-
lessness, misuse of a product, assumption of the risk, and unreasonable
97. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979).
98. Id. § 34-2804 (Supp. 1981).
99. Id § 34-2807.
100. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2949 (Supp. 1983-84):
(I) In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from death or in-
jury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contribu-
tory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs legal
representatives, but damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
101. Id. § 27A.2945. (Products liability has been interpreted to include breach of warranty).
See Jorae v. Clinton Crop Serv., 465 F. Supp. 952, 954 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
102. See N.Y. Ctv. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015
(SuPP. 1984-85).
103. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1304-1305 (Supp. 1983).
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1983).
105. For a more complete discussion of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, see Wade, supra
note 68.
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572o (West Supp. 1983-84) is based on § 2 of the UNIF.
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT.
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failure to avoid injury or to mitigate damages. °7 The Act does not
limit plaintiff's fault to conduct which under prior law constituted a
defense. 108
Unlike comparative causation, courts that compare fault must con-
sider the nature of the fault as well as the relative extent to which the
fault caused the injury."0 9 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act identi-
fies factors relating to the nature and percentage of a party's fault. Im-
portant considerations are whether the conduct was knowing or
inadvertent and the magnitude of the risk created, including the
number of people involved and the potential seriousness of the injury.
Other factors that a court should consider are the purpose and signifi-
cance of the actor's conduct, the actor's natural capacities, and other
particular circumstances such as emergency." 0 Thus, the Act is less
confusing to apply than comparative causation because a court has
guidelines to measure the nature of the conduct of the party at fault as
well as the causal relation between the conduct and the damages."'
Application of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act to breach of war-
ranty actions is superior to application of either comparative causation
or comparative negligence statutes. Legislative adoption of the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act is also better than judicial adoption of
comparative fault because the former alternative offers a complete and
logical system while the latter leaves issues for the court to decide ad
hoc. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides for joint and sev-
eral liability, extending the common law rule so that a plaintiff can
recover the total amount of his judgment from any defendant who is
liable." 2 Each party should, however, eventually have to bear the re-
sponsibility for his own fault because of the rules of contribution."
13
Additionally, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act specifically provides
for reallocation of an uncollectible share among all parties at fault to
spread the risk of uncollectability among all of the parties.' Set-off of
counterclaims is permitted by agreement of the parties." 5 Thus, the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act offers detailed provisions for issues
that judicial adoption of comparative fault leaves unsettled. The spe-
107. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § l(b) (1977); 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 1, Appendix K (1979).
108. Id § 1(a).
109. Id § 2(b). A court should consider "both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault
and the content of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed."
110. Id. § 2 comments.
111. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
112. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(c)(1977).
113. Id. §§ 4, 5.
114. Id § 2(d).
115. Id § 3. A set-off of counterclaims is permitted only by agreement of both parties.
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cific provisions of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act furnish a com-
plete system with which to work.
A major advantage of this system is that the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act adopts the pure type of comparative fault." 6 The trier of fact
must determine the total amount of the claimant's damages and the
percentage of fault of each party who contributed to the injury. The
claimant receives a judgment for his damages reduced by the percent-
age of his fault, whether or not his fault exceeds that of the defend-
ant." 7 Use of a pure comparative system assures that each party will
remain responsible for his own fault."18
Finally, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act meshes well with the
U.C.C. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act does not require any
changes in the U.C.C. itself."9 The Act gives greater clarity to the
comments to U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to 2-316 and 2-715, which speak of proxi-
mate cause by requiring a court to consider the nature of a party's con-
duct as well as the causal relation between the conduct and the injury.
The use of comparative fault eradicates the confusion over proper de-
fenses based upon a plaintiffs contributory behavior to breach of war-
ranty actions. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act therefore helps to
"simplify, clarify, modernize and make uniform the law governing
commercial transactions,"'' 2 thus promoting the underlying purposes
and policies of the U.C.C.
1 2 1
CONCLUSION
Courts have applied traditional defenses to achieve a more equitable
result in breach of warranty cases, but this has presented problems.
Comparative fault is the only logical solution to these problems. The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides a complete and uniform sys-
tem to measure pure comparative fault as opposed to comparing either
the parties' negligence or the extent to which each party's actions proxi-
mately caused the injury. The use of the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act with the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. is far better than appli-
116. For a discussion of the pros and cons of "pure" comparative fault, see the prefatory
comments to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Id. For the distinction between pure and
modified comparative systems, see supra note 94.
117. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2 (1977).
118. Adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act would, however, require states that now
have modified comparative negligence to switch to pure comparative negligence because the stat-
ute applies to all negligence cases as well as to products liability cases.
119. The final comment to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 11 (1977) explains: "This
Act does not necessitate any changes in the statutory language of Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, but it may have the effect of slightly modifying some of the comments to §§ 2-314 to
2-316 and 2-715 on proximate cause and the effect of contributory fault."
120. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1978).
121. Id § 1-102(1).
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cation of either the traditional defenses based upon the contributory
behavior of the injured party or the other methods of comparative
fault.
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